Coordinating a closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns through variable-weighted Shapley values

作者：Zheng, Xiao-Xue; Li, Deng-Feng; Liu, Zhi; Jia, Fu; Sheu, Jiuh-Biing^*

来源：TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW, 2019, 126: 227-253.

DOI：10.1016/j.tre.2019.04.006

• Closed-loop supply chain
• Remanufacturing outsourcing
• Cooperative game
• Fairness concerns
• Coordination
• Shapley value

This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) structure in which a manufacturer allows a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer to sell and remanufacture his products, respectively. Given the retailer's distributional fairness concerns, we investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions and profits under five non-cooperative and cooperative game models, and focus on how to allocate maximum profit in a centralized setting. Based on the classic Shapley value, we propose an innovative weighted allocation approach-namely, the variable-weighted Shapley value-to coordinate this CLSC. Numerical studies demonstrate that when remanufactured products are lowly accepted by consumers, our model outperforms the classic Shapley value.

• 单位
  1; 5; 福建农林大学; 安徽工程科技学院; 电子科技大学