摘要
Recently, many governments have levied environment tax on production while subsidizing the output of remanufactured components to promote resource-saving and pollution reduction. Considering government's regulations, this paper investigates whether the supplier selling remanufactured components (Supplier R) should develop a self-brand and whether the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) should keep sourcing from this competitive Supplier R or source from a supplier selling new components (Supplier N). We develop a channel system comprising of Supplier R, Supplier N, and OEM, based on which we analyze their equilibrium decisions in three typical structures (i.e., Base Scenario, Co-opetitive Scenario, Chain-to-chain Scenario). We find the OEM prefers to purchase remanufactured components when (1) its brand image advantage is significant; or (2) its brand image advantage is limited but the environment tax rate is high; or (3) its brand image advantage is limited, the environment tax rate is low, but the subsidy to supplier is high, even if Supplier R has self-brand and competes with the OEM. Our results are both theoretically interesting and practically relevant because we build a unifying model to study the government's regulation optimization and show a full map for both the component suppliers and the OEMs to decide market encroachment or channel structure configuration.
学科与关键词
- Production and pricing decisions in a dual-channel supply chain under remanufacturing subsidy policy and carbon tax policyCao, Kaiying; He, Ping*; Liu, ZhixinJournal of the Operational Research Society, 2020, 71(8): 1199-1215.被引 105
- Remanufacturer's downstream encroachment and incumbent brand's order shifting in Pareto improvement of economic and environmental sustainabilityNiu, Baozhuang; Yu, Xinhu; Zeng, Fanzhuo*COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, 2023, 182: 109417.被引 2
- COMPETITION AND COOPERATION STRATEGIESIN THE SUPPLY CHAINS WITH REMANUFACTURING AND REFURBISHINGLiu, Jing; Li, Kai*; Zhao, Nenggui; Fu, HongJournal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 2023, 19(12): 8505-8540.
