ScholarMate
English简体中文繁體中文
客服热线:400-1616-289
登录注册
期刊论文

Fine-cfi: Fine-grained control-flow integrity for operating system kernels

Li Jinku*; Tong Xiaomeng; Zhang Fengwei; Ma Jianfeng
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security2018DOI: 10.1109/TIFS.2018.2797932
8阅读
引用收藏
分享

摘要

The operating system kernel is often the security foundation for the whole system. To prevent attacks, control-flow integrity (CFI) has been proposed to ensure that any control transfer during the program's execution never deviates from its control-flow graph (CFG). Existing CFI solutions either work in user space or are coarse-grained;thus they cannot be readily deployed in kernels or are vulnerable to state-of-The-Art attacks. In this paper, we present Fine-CFI, a system that enforces fine-grained CFI for operating system kernels. Unlike previous systems, Fine-CFI constructs the kernel's fine-grained CFG with a retrofitted context-sensitive and field-sensitive pointer analysis, then enforces CFI with this CFG. At the same time, Fine-CFI provides comprehensive protection to the control data in the kernel's interrupt context. Combining the above two kinds of protection, we can thus defeat those formidable ret2usr and kernel code-reuse attacks. We have developed a compiler-based prototype and implemented this technique in Linux 3.14 kernel. Our evaluation indicates that Fine-CFI prevents all the gadgets found by an open-source gadget-finding tool from being misused, as well as all the attacks from the RIPE benchmark and malicious attempts to modify control data in the interrupt context;and it also reduces the number of indirect control-flow targets by 99.998%, thus largely raising the bar for attackers. Our evaluation also shows that the performance overhead introduced by Fine-CFI is less than 10% on average.<br/>

学科与关键词

关键词
Context sensitiveControl flow graphsControl-flow integritiesFine grainedFine-grained controlIntrusion preventionKernel protectionOperating system kernel
相关
加载中…
  • Prevent Kernel Return-Oriented Programming Attacks Using Hardware Virtualization
    Tian Shuo; He Yeping; Ding BaozengInformation Security Practice and Experience, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 289-300, 2012.
  • An Improved Kernel Trojan Horse Architecture Model
    Mingwei Zhao; Rongan JiangLecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 129-134, 2012.
  • Supporting operating system kernel data disambiguation using points-to analysis
    Amani S., Ibrahim; John, Grundy; James, Hamlyn-Harris; Mohamed, Almorsythe 27th IEEE/ACM International Conference, 2012-09-03 To 2012-09-07.
查看全部 →

发表信息

论文状态
公开发表
期刊
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
发表日期
2018
卷期
第 13 卷, 第 6 期
页码
1535
DOI
10.1109/TIFS.2018.2797932
语言
ENGLISH
期刊等级
Q1
成果收录
EI

作者

  • L

    Li Jinku (通讯) (第一作者)

  • T

    Tong Xiaomeng

查看全部 4 位作者收起作者
  • Z

    Zhang Fengwei

  • M

    Ma Jianfeng

登录解锁更多功能

  • 收藏这篇,随时在“我的 · 收藏”找回
  • 认领你的成果,生成推广素材
  • 关注作者获取最新成果
  • 加入项目组、协同写作
注册 / 登录

产品服务

  • 科研之友
  • 创新城
  • 科创云

服务支持

  • 帮助中心
  • 隐私政策
  • 服务条款

联系方式

在线客服:【】
客服热线:400-1616-289
电子邮箱:support@scholarmate.com

关注或下载科研之友

微信二维码
微信公众号
客户端下载二维码
下载客户端
科研成果科研人员科研机构科研动态爱瑞思软件

©2026 深圳市科研之友网络服务有限公司

公安备案图标粤公网安备 44030502000213
粤ICP备 16046710 号粤B2-20110417