Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing*,**

Authors：Liu, Xiang; Wu, Weiwei; Wang, Wanyuan^*; Xu, Yuhang; Wang, Xiumin^*; Cui, Helei

Source：Theoretical Computer Science, 2023, 970: 113978.

DOI：10.1016/j.tcs.2023.113978

• Crowdsensing
• Budget feasibility
• Sybil-proofness
• Mechanism design
• Auction

The rapid use of smartphones and devices leads to the development of crowdsensing (CS) systems where a large crowd of participants can take part in performing data collecting tasks in large-scale distributed networks. Participants/users in such systems are usually selfish and have private information, such as costs and identities. Budgetfeasible mechanism design, as a sub-field of auction theory, is a useful paradigm for crowdsensing, which naturally formulates the procurement scenario with buyers' budgets being considered and allows the users to bid their private costs. Although the bidding behavior is well-regulated, budget-feasible mechanisms are still vulnerable to the Sybil attack where users may generate multiple fake identities to manipulate the system. Thus, it is vital to provide Sybil-proof budget-feasible mechanisms for crowdsensing. In this paper, we design a budget-feasible incentive mechanism which can guarantee truthfulness and deter Sybil attack. We prove that the proposed mechanism achieves individual rationality, truthfulness, budget feasibility, and Sybil-proofness. Extensive simulation results further validate the efficiency of the proposed mechanism. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier B.V.

• Institution
  西北工业大学