A Nash-Stackelberg game approach to analyze strategic bidding for multiple DER aggregators in electricity markets

摘要

This paper discusses how to maximize the profits of multiple distributed energy resource (DER) aggregators in electricity markets when considering the safe operation of the distribution system. A Nash-Stackelberg game model is constructed to analyze the strategic bidding behavior of each DER aggregator. Within this model, DER aggregators, as leaders, decide the bidding quantity and price to maximize their profits by aggregating DERs in the distribution system, whereas the independent system operator, as one follower, clears electricity markets, and the distribution system operator, as another follower, checks the security of the distribution system. Additionally, we propose a customized algorithm to obtain the Nash equilibrium point of this model with integer variables in the follower level problem. The first step is the transformation of this model into a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) game model, which was done by applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker reformulation approach and the simplified shared-constraint method combined with the data-driven algorithm. Then, the GNE game model is further converted into a potential game model to solve. Lastly, simulations on two integrated transmission and distribution systems, a small and an actual system are conducted. The results indicate that the simplified shared constraint method combined with the data-driven hybrid algorithm is effective in solving the Nash-Stackelberg game model with integer variables at the lower level. Additionally, the proposed algorithm can be extended to solve integrated transmission and distribution systems with multiple distribution systems. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier Ltd.

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