摘要
Taking knowledge-advantage firms as masters and knowledge-disadvantage firms as apprentices in the knowledge chain, we construct a game model of knowledge collaboration strategy to explore how the knowledge potential difference affects the strategic choices of member firms. The theoretical results are verified by the case studies of HLT and KEDA and the simulation examples of the model. The research results show three points. First, the master may not be unemployed after sharing knowledge with the apprentice. Second, the master's optimal collaboration strategy is to actively share his own knowledge, while the apprentice's strategy is to absorb the knowledge of the master's knowledge under the influence of incentive and subsidy measures. Finally, the knowledge collaboration benefit of the knowledge chain can reach the Pareto optimum if the benefit distribution coefficient of the knowledge collaboration is controlled within a reasonable range. Specific countermeasures are proposed to help balance the distribution of knowledge collaboration benefits between the master and the apprentice.
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