摘要
In the digital era, online advertising fraud unfortunately undermines advertising and pricing cooperation in supply chains. In order to improve advertising effectiveness in a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper proposes three coordination mechanisms: cooperative advertising quality improvement (CQ), quality discount (QD) and a combination of the two (CQD). We derive the equilibrium advertising and pricing decisions in closed form under each mechanism. We show that improving advertising quality is always profitable for the two members, and that with QD included (either QD or CQD) can better coordinate the supply chain than CQ alone. However, the integration of a CQ and QD scheme is not always effective due to their interaction effects. Each mechanism can be achieved as an equilibrium strategy for supply chain members depending on their advertising effects. These insights offer theoretical evidence for the design of a supply chain coordination strategy.
学科与关键词
- 消费者反广告行为下的供应链合作广告模型张建强; 仲伟俊; 梅姝娥软科学, 2013, (01): 132-136.
- Cooperative advertising and coordination in a supply chain: the role of Nash bargaining fairness concernsDu, Xianjin*; Jiang, Shan; Tao, Shaokun*; Wang, ShuleiRAIRO-OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2024, 58(1): 1-18.
- 货架展示量与广告影响需求的供应链协调研究(英文)张成堂; 曹宗宏; 杨善林复旦学报(自然科学版), 2013, (02): 144.
