摘要
This study focuses on the impact of common ownership on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity using a sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2008 to 2020. We find common ownership significantly improves executive pay-for-performance sensitivity and plays a monitoring and governance role. Meanwhile, the impact of common ownership on executive payfor-performance sensitivity is more significant in non-state-owned firms (non-SOEs) and when a firm faces a highly competitive product market. The mechanism tests indicate that common ownership affects executive pay-for-performance sensitivity through the information and governance mechanisms. Further analyses show that the portion of compensation explained by common ownership significantly enhances future firm performance. Overall, our findings validate the positive role of common ownership in corporate governance.
学科与关键词
- The governance role of institutional investors in management compensation: evidence from ChinaZhu, Song; Huang, Haijie*; Bradford, WilliamAccounting and Finance, 2022, 62: 1015-1063.被引 18
- Do State-Owned Enterprises Have Worse Corporate Governance? An Empirical Study of Corporate Practices in ChinaChang, Yun-chien; Lin, Lauren Yu-Hsin*European Business Organization Law Review, 2022, 23(3): 711-734.被引 2
- Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitabilityChen, Shenglan; Ma, Hui; Wu, Qiang; Zhang, Hao*Journal of Corporate Finance, 2023, 80: 102389.被引 4
