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会议论文

Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Forward and Backward Private Searchable Symmetric Encryption

Xu, Lei*; Zheng, Leqian; Xu, Chengzhi; Yuan, Xingliang; Wang, Cong南京理工大学
30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS)2023DOI: 10.1145/3576915.3623085
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摘要

Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) enables a server to efficiently search and update over encrypted files. To minimize the leakage during updates, a security notion named forward and backward privacy is expected for newly proposed DSSE schemes. Those schemes are generally constructed in a way to break the linkability across search and update queries to a given keyword. However, it remains underexplored whether forward and backward private DSSE is resilient against practical leakage-abuse attacks (LAAs), where an attacker attempts to recover query keywords from the leakage passively collected during queries. @@@ In this paper, we aim to be the first to answer this question firmly through two non-trivial efforts. First, we revisit the spectrum of forward and backward private DSSE schemes over the past few years, and unveil some inherent constructional limitations in most schemes. Those limitations allow attackers to exploit query equality and establish a guaranteed linkage among different (refreshed) query tokens surjective to a candidate keyword. Second, we refine volumetric leakage profiles of updates and queries by associating each with a specific operation. By further exploiting update volume and query response volume, we demonstrate that all forward and backward private DSSE schemes can leak the same volumetric information (e.g., insertion volume, deletion volume) as those without such security guarantees. To testify our findings, we realize two generic LAAs, i.e., frequency matching attack and volumetric inference attack, and we evaluate them over various experimental settings in the dynamic context. Finally, we call for new efficient schemes to protect query equality and volumetric information across search and update queries.

学科与关键词

关键词
searchable encryptionforward and backward privacyvulnerabilitiesleakage attacks
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会议信息

会议名称
30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS)
会议日期
2023-11-26 至 2023-11-30
论文集名
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2023 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, CCS 2023
发表日期
2023
起止页码
3003-3017
DOI
10.1145/3576915.3623085
资助标注
National Natural Science Foundation of China [62202228]; Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province [BK20210330]; Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [30923011023]; HK RGC [CityU 11217620, 11218521, 11218322, R1012-21, RFS2122-1S04, C2004-21G, N_CityU139/21]; Australian Research Council [DP200103308]; InnoHK initiative; Government of the HKSAR; Laboratory for AI-Powered Financial Technologies
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作者

  • X

    Xu, Lei (通讯) (第一作者)

    nanjing univ sci & technol

  • Z

    Zheng, Leqian

查看全部 5 位作者收起作者
  • X

    Xu, Chengzhi

    nanjing univ sci & technol

  • Y

    Yuan, Xingliang

  • W

    Wang, Cong

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