摘要
We study whether a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it obtain loans. In China, Regulation No. 18 (announced in 2013) prohibits all high-level government officials from being independent directors of firms. As a result, many firms lost their political connections. We find that after firms lose their politically connected independent directors, firms having no social connections to banks experience, on average, a 12% decrease in the bank loan ratio relative to the median ratio; but those whose board chairs or CEOs are socially connected to local bank branch heads experience a 22% increase in the loan ratio relative to the median. However, this positive effect is short lived and thus not a new equilibrium. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it get bank financing.
学科与关键词
- Depoliticization and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from the mandated resignation of directors in ChinaChang, Yuyuan; Pan, Xiaofei*; Wang, Jianling; Zhou, QingJournal of Corporate Finance, 2021, 69: 102004.被引 14
- Pay of political directors in ChinaWang, Xiaoming; Xu, Tingting*Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 2022, 74: 101803.被引 1
- Political connection, contract intensity, and OFDI: Evidence from ChinaGuo, Guangyuan; Li, Jing; Wang, Dan; Zhang, Lina*Journal of Economic Surveys, 2022, 36(3): 534-557.被引 4
