摘要
We examine the impact of subsidies on firm-level investments using a panel of Chinese listed firms from 2008 to 2019. The Chinese government adopts a two-staged 'touching stones to cross the river' strategy in allocating funds and supervision efforts to listed firms. Subsidies granted in the early stage ('one-off subsidies') boost long-term investments, with 0.588 of every RMB 1 of subsidy being used for corporate investment. In contrast, in the later stage ('repeated subsidies'), only 0.122 of every RMB 1 of subsidy is used for this purpose. We attribute this decrease to the ability of government supervision to effectively restrain overinvestment in capital expenditures.
学科与关键词
关键词
Government subsidiesCorporate investmentPromoting effectsSupervision effectsRepeated subsidies
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