ScholarMate
English简体中文繁體中文
客服热线:400-1616-289
登录注册
期刊论文

Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitability

Chen, Shenglan; Ma, Hui; Wu, Qiang; Zhang, Hao*浙江工业大学
Journal of Corporate Finance2023-6DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102389
4被引11阅读
引用收藏
分享

摘要

This study identifies a new economic benefit of common institutional ownership, which refers to the increasingly contentious phenomenon of U.S. firms sharing stockholders with their industry competitors. We find a significantly negative relation between common ownership and insider trading profitability. The disciplinary effect of common ownership on opportunistic insider trading is particularly evident when the information effects of common ownership are greater, when common owners are more likely to benefit from positive governance externalities, and in the subset of trades made by opportunistic insiders. Using the exogenous variations in common ownership induced by financial institution mergers, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis and find consistent results. We also provide evidence that common owners encourage firms to impose ex-ante restrictions on insider trading and take ex-post actions to discipline opportunistic insiders by voting against management. Overall, our findings suggest that common institutional shareholders have information advantages, governance incentives, and effective means to constrain opportunistic insider trading.

学科与关键词

关键词
Common ownershipManagerial opportunismInsider tradingInstitutional investors
相关
加载中…
  • Common institutional ownership and stock price crash risk
    Chen, Shenglan; Ma, Hui; Wu, Qiang; Zhang, Hao*Contemporary Accounting Research, 2024, 41(1): 679-711.
  • Can common institutional owners inhibit bad mergers and acquisitions? Evidence from China
    Zhu, Siyuan*; Lu, Rong; Xu, Tianli; Wu, Wenbin; Chen, YangInternational Review of Economics and Finance, 2024, 89: 246-266.被引 1
  • IS INSIDER TRADING REGULATION EFFECTIVE? EVIDENCE FROM UK TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
    Brendan, LambeJournal of Governance and Regulation, 2012, 1(2).
查看全部 →

发表信息

论文状态
公开发表
期刊
Journal of Corporate Finance
发表日期
2023-06
卷期
第 80 卷
页码
102389
DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102389
语言
ENGLISH
成果收录
SSCI
资助标注
National Social Science Fund [22FJYB014]; Zhejiang Provincial Social Science Planning project [21WZQH08Z]; China National Natural Science Foundation [72032003, 72102166]; MOE Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Science in University [22, JJD790094]; 111 Project [B18033]; start-up fund at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University [1-BE52]; Saunders College of Business at RIT

作者

  • C

    Chen, Shenglan (第一作者)

    zhejiang univ technol

  • M

    Ma, Hui

查看全部 4 位作者收起作者
  • W

    Wu, Qiang

    hong kong polytech univ

  • Z

    Zhang, Hao (通讯)

登录解锁更多功能

  • 收藏这篇,随时在“我的 · 收藏”找回
  • 认领你的成果,生成推广素材
  • 关注作者获取最新成果
  • 加入项目组、协同写作
注册 / 登录

产品服务

  • 科研之友
  • 创新城
  • 科创云

服务支持

  • 帮助中心
  • 隐私政策
  • 服务条款

联系方式

在线客服:【】
客服热线:400-1616-289
电子邮箱:support@scholarmate.com

关注或下载科研之友

微信二维码
微信公众号
客户端下载二维码
下载客户端
科研成果科研人员科研机构科研动态爱瑞思软件

©2026 深圳市科研之友网络服务有限公司

公安备案图标粤公网安备 44030502000213
粤ICP备 16046710 号粤B2-20110417