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期刊论文

Joint coordination contract for capital-constrained supply chains under asymmetric information

Yan, Bo; Liu, Yanping*; Jin, Zijie
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS2023-1DOI: 10.1002/mde.3678
2被引14阅读
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摘要

A two-echelon supply chain considering capital constraints and asymmetric information is established. The supplier provides credit guarantees for the capital-constrained retailer to loan from the bank, and its information about the retailer's capital type is asymmetric. The equilibrium decisions of supply chain participants are analyzed by using the Stackelberg game theory and principal-agent theory. Then, a joint contract is designed to eliminate the double marginalization effect. The results show that the supplier and the bank make different decisions for different types of retailers to avoid adverse selection. The joint contract of revenue-sharing and transfer payment can coordinate the supply chain.

学科与关键词

关键词
TRADE CREDITCOST INFORMATIONDOWNSIDE RISKFINANCECHANNELDESIGNMODELEQUILIBRIUMBANKRUPTCYMECHANISM
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发表信息

论文状态
公开发表
期刊
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS
发表日期
2023-01
卷期
第 44 卷, 第 1 期
页码
251-270
DOI
10.1002/mde.3678
成果收录
SSCI
资助标注
National Natural Science Foundation of China [71871098]

作者

  • Y

    Yan, Bo (第一作者)

  • L

    Liu, Yanping (通讯)

查看全部 3 位作者收起作者
  • J

    Jin, Zijie

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